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HALPIN ON DWORKIN'S FALLACY: A SURREPL Y 
Michael Steven Green* 
PROFESSOR Halpin claims to read my 2003 Essay Dworkin's Fallacy generously, by "accept[ing] that Green is correct in re-
jecting the assumed connection between the philosophy of lan-
guage and the philosophy of law."' We later discover, however, 
that he believes it is possible to "refute Green's arguments that 
there is no necessary connection between [the philosophy of law] and 
the philosophy of language. "2 
Is the generosity feigned? Perhaps not, for there are really two 
arguments in my Essay and Halpin might be understood as accept-
ing the first and rejecting the second. The first argument is that a 
particular confusion of linguistic and legal practices-which I call 
Dworkin's fallacy-can motivate the philosopher of law to mis-
derive jurisprudential conclusions from semantic premises. Halpin 
might be generous in accepting that Dworkin's fallacy is indeed a 
fallacy. But I also claim that this fallacy is the cause of much, if not 
most, jurisprudential interest in the philosophy of language. For 
this reason, I argue that "[t]he philosophy of language generally 
has no jurisprudential consequences"3 and that "philosophers of 
law would have been better off if the philosophy of language had 
been set aside entirely."4 
Halpin is wrong to attribute to me the view that there is no nec-
essary connection between the two fields. 5 I devoted the conclusion 
of my previous Essay to describing three cases where Dworkin's 
fallacy does not apply, and the philosophy of language is relevant 
• Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. Ph.D. (Philoso-
phy), Yale University, 1990; J.D., Yale Law School, 1996. 
'Andrew Halpin, Or, Even, What the Law Can Teach the Philosophy of Language: 
A Response to Green's Dworkin's Fallacy, 91 Va. L. Rev. 175, 175 (2005). 
2 ld. at 180. 
3 Michael Steven Green, Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language 
Can't Teach Us About the Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1897, 1898 (2003). 
4 Id. at 1946. 
'Id. at 1947 ("I cannot ... make a categorical claim about the irrelevance [of the 
philosophy of language for the philosophy of law]." (emphasis added)). 
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to jurisprudential concerns.6 But even in these three cases I am 
skeptical that the philosophy of language will provide us with much 
of jurisprudential interest. Halpin, it seems, disagrees. 
I'll begin by identifying Dworkin's fallacy and distinguishing it 
from the legitimate connections between the philosophies of lan-
guage and law that are Halpin's area of interest. This will be fol-
lowed by a discussion of whether these connections, although le-
gitimate, are significant. Finally I will discuss another substantive 
disagreement between the two of us-whether Dennis Patterson's 
legal theory suffers from Dworkin's fallacy. 
I. DWORKIN'S FALLACY 
Dworkin's fallacy is the belief that a jurisprudential theory-a 
theory of the nature of the law-can be arrived at by applying a 
semantic theory to the word "law." To get a feel for the fallacy, it is 
important to understand some of the jurisprudential and semantic 
theories at issue. 
There is a long-standing jurisprudential tradition according to 
which the existence of law is ultimately a question of convention. 
For example, according to this approach, the Constitution is valid 
American law because it has been accepted as law by American of-
ficials or the American people as a whole. H .L.A. Hart is a mem-
ber of this tradition, for he explains the ultimate source of law in a 
rule of recognition-. that is, a practice among officials of enforcing 
certain norms (such as the Constitution) and not others (such as 
the Articles of Confederation) according to whether they satisfy 
accepted criteria for legality. Ronald Dworkin, in contrast, is anti-
conventionalist. A norm can be law, he argues, even if it is not ac-
cepted by officials in a jurisdiction as law, provided it is revealed as 
law through a process of interpretive reflection on the underlying 
moral purposes of legal practices. 
There is a seemingly parallel debate concerning conventionalism 
in semantics. According to the semantic conventionalist, a term's 
reference (that is, the set of things that fall under the term) is de-
termined by the accepted criteria for employing the term. In the 
sixteenth century the term "gold" referred to everything that was a 
heavy, yellow, ductile metal, because those were the criteria asso-
• Id . at 1946--52; see also id. at 1927 n.76. 
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ciated with the use of the term. In the twenty-first century, how-
ever, "gold" refers to everything that has the atomic number 79, 
because that is now the accepted criterion (at least among scien-
tists). 
Some philosophers of language-call them "realists"-disagree. 
Although people in the sixteenth century would have applied the 
word "gold" to a heavy, yellow, ductile metal that did not have the 
atomic number 79, even in the sixteenth century the term actually 
referred only to stuff with that atomic number. The underlying 
structure of gold, not accepted use, determines the reference of the 
word. 
Underlying structures seem unavailable, however, to explain 
the reference of terms like "justice" or "law." Nevertheless, 
some philosophers-call them "interpretivists"-argue that seman-
tic anti-conventionalism is possible here as well. The reference of 
these words can still outstrip accepted use, because the practice of 
using the words can reform itself through a process of reflective 
equilibrium, revealing criteria for use of which participants were 
previously unaware. Although most Americans in the early nine-
teenth century would have called slavery "just," slavery did not in 
fact fall under the term (even for them), because the practice of us-
ing the term has reformed itself over time. 
Dworkin argues that Hart's conventionalist semantics is respon-
sible for his conventionalist jurisprudence. Because Hart takes the 
reference of the term "law" to be determined by accepted use, he 
concludes that a norm is law only if officials within a jurisdiction 
agree that it is law. Furthermore, in his famous "semantic sting" 
argument, Dworkin uses the failure of conventionalist semantics to 
argue that Hart's conventionalist jurisprudence likewise fails. 
This is Dworkin's fallacy. To see why it is a fallacy, consider the 
simpler example of the word "convention."7 If interpretive seman-
tics applied to this word, its reference would be determined, not by 
accepted use, but by whatever criteria eventually resulted from re-
flective equilibrium. But even though the practice of using the 
word "convention" is not determined by agreement, it does not fol-
7 As I noted in my prior Essay, I borrowed this example from Michael Moore, Law 
as a Functional Kind, in Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 188, 205 (Robert 
P. George ed., 1992). See Green, supra note 3, at 1931 n.89. 
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low that conventions are not determined by agreement. It is en-
tirely possible-indeed overwhelmingly likely-that, after reflec-
tive equilibrium is over, we will have arrived at the conclusion that 
a practice is a convention only to the extent that there is agreement 
among its participants. 
Conventions can be conventional even when the practice of talk-
ing about them is not for the simple reason that the practice of 
talking about practices is different from the practices talked about. 
Analogously, Dworkin confuses legal practices-in particular, rules 
of recognition-with the linguistic practice of talking about these 
legal practices. Even if one assumes that interpretive semantics ap-
plies to the word "law," the fact remains that, at the end of reflec-
tive equilibrium, we could still conclude that a norm deserves to be 
called the "law" of a jurisdiction only if officials in that jurisdiction 
agree that it should be enforced. 
Dworkin does not merely conflate semantic and jurisprudential 
conventionalism-he also conflates semantic and jurisprudential 
interpretivism. In Law's Empire, he treats the semantic sting argu-
ment as a sufficient reason to adopt his interpretive jurisprudence. 
But simply because the proper criteria for using the word "law" are 
whatever will result from reflective equilibrium among the partici-
pants in the linguistic practice of using the word is not a reason to 
conclude that the law of a jurisdiction is whatever will result from 
critical reflection by the participants in its rule of recognition, much 
less critical reflection on the moral purposes of that legal practice, 
as is the case in Dworkin's interpretive jurisprudence.8 
Of course, Dworkin's interpretive jurisprudence or any number 
of other nonconventionalist theories of law could result from re-
flective equilibrium on the linguistic practice of using the word 
"law." (Another nonconventionalist jurisprudence is classical natu-
• We should not be distracted by the fact that Dworkin provides a further argument 
against conventionalism from within the framework of interpretive jurisprudence. 
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 114-50 (1986). Dworkin considers whether reflection 
upon the moral purposes of our legal practices should not lead us to conclude that the 
law is best limited to norms concerning which there is official agreement, in order to 
respect citizens' settled expectations. (He ultimately rejects this argument in favor of 
his theory of law as integrity.) But the question remains why Dworkin's methodology 
of interpretive jurisprudence is justified in the first place. And he arrives at this meth-
odology, via Dworkin's fallacy, through his semantic sting argument. Green, supra 
note 3, at 1920 n.63. 
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rallaw theory, in which a norm must satisfy independent moral cri-
teria to qualify as law.) But that simply shows that there is no es-
sential connection between semantics and jurisprudence of the sort 
that Dworkin assumes. 
II. BEYOND DWORKIN'S FALLACY: OTHER CONNECfiONS 
BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 
Dworkin's fallacy rests upon the conflation of the linguistic prac-
tice of using the word "law" with rules of recognition. But as Hal-
pin rightly notes, it is not a fallacy to assume that there are other 
connections between linguistic and legal practices that could make 
the philosophy of language relevant to the philosophy of law: 
"[L]aw is, among other things, a practice of using words. It is possi-
ble then that the position we take on the practice of using words 
within our philosophy of language is the same position we adopt on 
the practice of using words in our philosophy of law. "9 
Halpin is correct that lawyers and judges talk (a lot) and so legal 
practices cannot help but incorporate linguistic practices. Further-
more there is no reason to believe that the semantics that applies 
to words outside the law would not also apply to them when they 
are used within the law. 
I provide an example illustrating just this point in the conclusion 
to Dworkin's Fallacy. If a constitutional amendment establishes the 
gold standard, the semantics of the word "gold" should be relevant 
to a judge interpreting the scope of the amendment. This could 
have an important impact on our understanding of the legal prac-
tice of adjudication. Under realist or interpretive semantics, the 
judge could show fidelity to the meaning of the amendment even if 
she took it to apply to stuff that its drafters would not have called 
"gold." 
I make the same point earlier in the Essay as well. 10 If interpre-
tive semantics is right, jurisprudential conventionalists like Hart 
must admit that this semantics applies to the words used to articu-
late the criteria in the rule of recognition. 11 For example, assume 
there is a crude rule of recognition under which officials enforce 
9 Halpin, supra note 1, at 177. 
10 Green, supra note 3, at 1927 n.76. 
11 Id. at 1927 n.76. 
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only norms that are on a tablet. According to interpretive seman-
tics, a norm might properly be described as "on the tablet"-and so 
be law according to the rule of recognition-even though the par-
ticipants in the rule of recognition don't think it is. 12 
This connection between linguistic and legal practices might be a 
reason to think that my second argument is wrong, but not my first. 
Dworkin's fallacy depends upon the belief that rules of recognition 
are the same thing as the linguistic practice of using the word "law," 
not the belief that legal practices cannot incorporate linguistic 
practices. Dworkin's fallacy is tempting because anyone participat-
ing in a rule of recognition-for example, a judge adjudicating a 
case-will call the norms that she enforces "law," which makes the 
rule of recognition look like the practice of using the word "law." 
And if they were the same practice, then Dworkin's fallacy would 
not be a fallacy. The norms governing our employment of the word 
"law" would be legal norms, and linguistic and legal anti-
conventionalism would amount to the same thing. 
But the two practices are not the same. Although Halpin finds 
the distinctions I draw between the two practices unconvincing, he 
does not address the fundamental difference that I pointed out in 
my previous Essay. Dworkin's fallacy, I argued, "depends upon 
confusin~ the practice of describing a practice with the practice de-
scribed." 3 Participating in a practice of talking about legal practices 
is clearly not the same thing as participating in the practices de-
scribed. It is possible to speak of American, French, and German 
law in the same breath. It is not possible to sit simultaneously on 
the Supreme Court, the Conseil Constitutionnel, and the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht. 
It is the linguistic practice of talking about legal practices that es-
tablishes the meaning and reference of the word "law" and thus the 
conditions for the existence of law in various jurisdictions. If the 
participants in the linguistic practice determine that a norm should 
be called the "law" of a jurisdiction only if it meets independent 
moral requirements, then even if all the judges in the jurisdiction 
enforce norms that violate these moral requirements, such norms 
are not the law of that jurisdiction. To be sure, most people con-
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1919. 
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sider the fact that judges enforce a norm to be a reason to conclude 
that the norm is the law of that jurisdiction. But that is simply a re-
flection of the fact that we, as participants in the linguistic practice, 
are inclined toward conventionalist jurisprudence. 
Halpin may not be arguing that the two practices are the same 
however. His point may be only that the philosophy of language 
that applies to the practice of using the word "law" will also apply 
to legal practices, insofar as words are used in those practices. Of 
course, as my gold standard and tablet examples show, I do not 
deny this. But Halpin's target may be my second argument-that the 
connections between the philosophies of language and law (those 
that do not suffer from Dworkin's fallacy, that is) are insignificant. 
Because legal practices incorporate linguistic practices, he may bear-
guing, we have reason to believe that the effect of the philosophy of 
language on the philosophy of law will be significant. 
Halpin sees another very different connection between linguistic 
and legal practices that may threaten my second argument as well. 
This is his idea that "both the law and the language of the law are 
developed together at the point of determining what the law re-
quires."14 Halpin's is a general methodological point that is not tied 
to particular theories of the law. To show this, he assumes that we 
accept natural law theory: 
[I]f ... we reject the court's judgment that a contract is valid be-
cause it fails to satisfy an independent moral requirement, we 
still need a judgment as to how that independent moral require-
ment . . . applies to this particular agreement. At that point of 
judgment both the law and the word "contract" are clarified.15 
Because "both the law and the language of the law are simultane-
ously and inextricably together clarified,"16 the law cannot be di-
vorced from our practices of talking about the law. 
I discuss what I believe is a similar idea when outlining the con-
ventionalist theory of meaning. This theory, I argue, "is tied to es-
sential issues of philosophical method"17 in the following sense: For 
the conventionalist, an account of the meaning of a word will also 
14 Halpin, supra note 1, at 180. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. 
17 Green, supra note 3, at 1900. 
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be an account of the existence conditions for the thing to which the 
word refers. This connection between linguistic practices and the 
things to which these practices refer is what grounds the traditional 
philosopher's method. Traditional philosophers analyze the mean-
ings of words like "freedom," "knowledge," or "law" to find out 
"what must be the case for freedom, knowledge or law to exist in 
the world." 18 This means that, for the traditionalist, Halpin is 
right-"both the law and the language of the law are simultane-
ously and inextricably together clarified. "19 
Of course, the traditional philosopher of law does not believe 
that every truth about the law can be revealed simply by reflecting 
on our practice of talking about the law. Only analytic truths about 
the law can be arrived at in this fashion. Jurisprudential theories 
(such as conventionalism or natural law theory) might be examples 
of such analytic truths, but not particular judgments about whether 
something is the law of a jurisdiction. And Halpin's contract exam-
ple suggests that he is arguing that the practice of talking about the 
law is clarified whenever the law is. After all, that a particular 
agreement is a valid contract is not an analytic truth about the 
law-it is synthetic, in the sense that it requires information over 
and above knowledge of the meaning of the word "law" or "con-
tract." 
But there is a possibility of making sense of Halpin's more com-
prehensive claim if we turn to interpretive semantics.20 If this se-
mantics is correct, there is no distinction between empirical inquiry 
into the thing to which a word refers and the transformation, 
through reflective equilibrium, of the practice of talking about that 
thing.21 It is not as if we have a definition of "law" and then con-
sider the evidence to see what does and does not fit this definition. 
The definition is always vulnerable to reform in the process of 
making particular judgments. In this sense, it is true as a compre-
Is Id. 
19 Halpin, supra note 1, at 180. 
20 That the same point applies if one adopts realist semantics is more doubtful. The 
realist understands the meaning of a term as fixed by the underlying structure of the 
stuff first pointed to in connection with the word, to which linguistic practices may 
forever fail to correspond. This suggests that reality reveals itself in a way that is di-
vorced from the development of our linguistic practices. I cannot, however, pursue 
this issue here. 
21 Green, supra note 3, at 1913. 
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hensive matter that "the law and the language of the law are simul-
taneously and inextricably together clarified."22 
Once again, I agree with Halpin's methodological point. As I ar-
gued in my previous Essay, if the interpretive theory of meaning is 
true of the word "law," then "we can figure out which norms 
should be called 'law' only by participating in the interpretive prac-
tice of using that word. "23 The unfolding of the law and the unfold-
ing of the practice of talking about the law will be indistinguish-
able. Halpin's point will also apply if one accepts a Wittgensteinian 
theory (or anti-theory) of meaning-and it is indeed Wittgenstein, 
not interpretive semantics, that Halpin is primarily thinking about. 
Here too, figuring out what is and is not law can be answered only 
"within the framework of our practices concerning the use of the 
word 'law."'24 
What all this shows is that the philosophy of language is very 
relevant to the questions of jurisprudential method. How one un-
derstands linguistic practices-and so the practice of using the 
word "law"-will determine what it means to inquire into the law. 
The conventionalist, realist, interpretivist, and Wittgensteinian will 
each have a different view of what a philosopher of law is doing 
when she provides a theory of the nature of the law. 
In the conclusion to Dworkin's Fallacy, I identify the philosophy 
of language as relevant to questions of jurisprudential method in 
just this sense. Indeed, I apparently go further than Halpin and ar-
gue that there are cases where the philosophy of language has the 
potential to generate substantive jurisprudential conclusions. 
Theories of the nature of the law, I argue, might be blocked by phi-
losophies of language, because the latter might show that we could 
never use the word "law" in a way that would generate the former. 
For example, natural law theory would not be viable if a verifica-
tionist philosophy of language told us that we are unable to speak 
about morality. 
This is, once again, a reason to believe that my second argument 
is mistaken. But it is not a reason to think that Dworkin's fallacy is 
not a fallacy. Dworkin's fallacy arises from conflating the practice 
22 Halpin, supra note 1, at 180. 
23 Green, supra note 3, at 1919-20. 
24 Id. at 1943. 
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of talking about the law with a legal practice in a particular juris-
diction, namely, the rule of recognition. One can reject the fallacy 
and still accept Halpin's idea that the law of various jurisdictions is 
revealed in the context of the linguistic practice of talking about 
them. 
Ill. How SIGNIFICANT IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw? 
In short, both Halpin and I think there are legitimate areas of 
connection between the philosophies of language and law. But, 
unlike Halpin, I argue these connections do not make much of a 
difference. 
For example, even though I admit that semantic theories will 
apply to words used within legal practices, I question whether these 
theories will have much effect on our understanding of legal prac-
tices. Realist and interpretive semantics, although permitting refer-
ence that outstrips current agreement, do not mandate it. The 
drafters of our gold standard amendment are not obligated to refer 
to what is actually gold. They can make it clear that they are using 
the word in a way that is intended to refer only to what is conven-
tionally thought to be gold at the time of drafting.25 
By the same token, although interpretive semantics can have an 
effect on the conventionalist's understanding of the criteria used 
within a rule of recognition, it cannot show that a conventionalist 
theory of law is wrong. The fact that a norm could be "on the tab-
let" even though the participants in the rule of recognition don't 
think it is does not show that the law is nonconventional. The law 
can still be conventional in the sense that being "on the tablet" is 
all that matters when determining the law of that jurisdiction, be-
cause this criterion is the only one agreed upon by participants in 
the rule of recognition.26 
Halpin, in contrast, thinks the connections between the philoso-
phies of language and law are significant. Nevertheless, I doubt 
25 Id. at 1950-51. 
26 Id. at 1928 n.76. Furthermore, since reflective equilibrium is undertaken from the 
perspective of the prereflective commitments of participants in the linguistic practice 
reflected upon, any reform of the use of a term will not be radical. This makes it 
unlikely that a norm is going to suddenly be identified as being "on the tablet" that 
was not considered to be on the tablet before. 
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that the reason is that he thinks the above arguments are mistaken, 
since he never discusses them in his reply. 
Halpin's real concern is the importance of the philosophy of lan-
guage for questions of jurisprudential method. Here too, I was 
skeptical that the philosophy of language will yield interesting 
jurisprudential consequences. Even though the philosophy of lan-
guage reveals what a philosopher of law is doing when she comes 
up with a theory of law, it does not tell us whether this theory will 
(or should) be natural law theory, Dworkinian interpretivism, Har-
tian conventionalism, or something else.27 Indeed, even if certain 
theories of the nature of the law can be "blocked" by a position in 
the philosophy of language, I argue, there will be little in the way 
of jurisprudential consequences, because plenty of non-blocked 
jurisprudential positions will remain to choose from. 28 
Curiously, here as well Halpin does not appear to disagree with 
my argument. Indeed, he even joins me in suggesting that the 
methodological insight provided by Wittgenstein "furnishes no help 
in deciding between competing views of how 'law'/law should be un-
derstood. ,m 
The truth is the connections between the philosophies of lan-
guage and law that Halpin identifies are of a very different sort 
from those I entertained in Dworkin's Fallacy. I was concerned 
with whether the philosophy of language could provide substantive 
results in the philosophy of law. From what I can tell, Halpin 
agrees with me that it cannot. But Halpin argues that the philoso-
phy of law has important consequences for the philosophy of lan-
guage. Hence the title of his reply. 
If I understand him correctly, Halpin's point is this: Jurispruden-
tial disagreements concerning the proper theory of law are the re-
sult of the contentiousness of individual judgments about what is 
law. Of course, this is not in itself surprising, since in any area of 
inquiry disagreement in individual judgments about the thing in-
vestigated will tend to express itself in competing theories of that 
thing. If people disagree in their judgments about what is gold, they 
are likely to come up with different theories of gold. Just as reality 
27 Id. at 1948. 
28 Id. at 1950. 
29 Halpin, supra note 1, at 184. 
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anci our practice of talking about reality are revealed together, they 
are obscured together. 
But in the law, Halpin argues, "the very use of judgment is pos-
ited on controversy."30 There are practical considerations impelling 
us toward a judgment about what is law, considerations that do not 
exist elsewhere. For this reason "the co-relationship between law and 
language breaks down. "31 Practical necessity will mean that legal 
judgment will precede the evolution of our practice of talking about 
the law. In this sense, "the practice of language depends on the prac-
tice of law."32 It is this important insight, Halpin claims, that "the law 
can teach the philosophy of language. "33 
Unfortunately without further elaboration on these suggestive re-
marks, I cannot come to a conclusion about whether I agree with 
him. It is fair to say that even if he is correct (and I am not saying that 
he is not), we are quite far from the concerns of my previous Essay, 
which had to do with whether the philosophy of language could gen-
erate substantive jurisprudential consequences. 
IV. DENNIS PATIERSON AND DWORKIN'S FALLACY 
One aspect of Halpin's reply for which I am particularly thankful 
is his discussion of Dennis Patterson's legal theory. In my previous 
Essay I argued that Patterson suffers from Dworkin's fallacy. Hal-
pin disagrees. This difference between us provides me with the op-
portunity to elaborate upon what was a very compressed argument 
in the original. 
Let us begin with Patterson's position in the philosophy of lan-
guage. Patterson accepts what he describes as Wittgenstein's view 
that "the modernist picture of propositional, representationalist 
truth [is] unintelligible."34 The idea of a sentence being true or false 
through its relation to the world should be replaced "with an ac-
count of understanding that emphasizes practice, warranted assert-
ability, and pragmatism."35 Rather than seeing knowledge as an ac-




34 Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 160--61 (1996); see also Green, supra note 3, at 
1933-42. 
35 Patterson, supra note 34, at 161. 
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curate picturing of reality, it "will be unpacked in terms of linguis-
tic competence, facility in the languages of man."36 
This should be familiar, since it is very much akin to Halpin's 
idea that "the law and the language of the law are simultaneously 
and inextricably together clarified."37 The truth of statements about 
law will depend fundamentally upon facility in linguistic practices. 
The attempt to articulate "the ways in which legal language repre-
sents, depicts, and captures the world"38 must be abandoned. 
But no theory of the nature of the law follows from this insight. 
And deriving a theory of the law is just what Patterson tries to do. 
The foundation of Patterson's argument is that justifications are 
demanded within our legal practices before norms will be enforced. 
These justifications, he argues, have certain forms. Patterson then 
claims that it follows from the Wittgensteinian insight that "with-
out [these forms] there is no law."39 
This is an example of Dworkin's fallacy. If the Wittgensteinian 
insight is correct, then the truth of statements about law (for ex-
ample, the statement "The Securities Exchange Act is valid law in 
the United States") is not a question of correspondence to some 
external state of affairs-it is instead a matter of facility in talk 
about the law. Such facility is manifested by familiarity with certain 
forms in which statements about the law are justified. But no the-
ory of the nature of the law follows from this, not even Patterson's 
theory that "without [the forms] there is no law." 40 
Patterson thinks a theory of the law follows from the Wittgen-
steinian insight because he conflates the linguistic practice of talk-
ing about law with the legal practice of the rule of recognition-that 
is, the practice within a jurisdiction of enforcing norms only if they 
satisfy certain criteria. The confusion is easy to make because, as 
Patterson himself notes, participants in the rule of recognition will 
often demand a satisfactory argument before a norm is enforced, 
and this argument will have to satisfy certain forms. 
But because the two practices are different, so are the two sets of 
forms. And it could follow from the forms of the linguistic practice 
36 ld. at 169. 
37 Halpin, supra note 1, at 180. 
38 Patterson, supra note 34, at 169. 
39 Id. at 178. 
•o Id. 
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that the law can exist perfectly well without the forms of the legal 
practice. Assume that it follows from the forms of the linguistic 
practice that a norm cannot be described as "law" unless it satisfies 
certain independent moral requirements. Assume further that ac-
cording to the forms of a particular rule of recognition, judges do 
not require an argument that independent moral requirements are 
satisfied when determining whether a norm should be enforced. 
Patterson's jurisprudential theory-that the law will depend upon 
the forms of the legal practice-will be false, even though the 
Wittgensteinian insight that the law and the language of the law 
develop together will be true. 
Of course it is possible that Patterson never meant his theory to 
stand in competition with natural law theory or Hartian conven-
tionalism or Dworkinian interpretivist jurisprudence. He may in-
stead have been objecting to the fact that the philosophers of law 
advocating these theories also offer theories of the truth of propo-
sitions about law-theories that are contrary to the Wittgen-
steinian insight. But if that is Patterson's point, why does he take 
the failure of the theories of truth to be a reason to criticize the 
jurisprudential positions with which they were conjoined?41 That 
the theories of truth fail gives him no reason to believe that the 
theories of law are not still correct. Patterson must think the theo-
ries of truth and the theories of the nature of law are somehow 
connected. The reason, I have argued, is Dworkin's fallacy. Patter-
son has confused the practice of talking about the law with the rule 
of recognition within a jurisdiction. 
As we have seen, Halpin also comes to the conclusion that Pat-
terson's Wittgensteinian methodology "furnishes no help in decid-
ing between competing views of how 'law' /law should be under-
stood. "42 But he arrives at this conclusion in a more circuitous 
fashion, because he believes that my argument in Dworkin's Fal-
lacy is confused. 
The heart of Halpin's criticism is that in Dworkin's Fallacy I fail 
to observe the Wittgensteinian insight concerning "the simultane-
ous and inextricable development of law and language together at 
"Id. at 44-50, 59-70,71-98. 
'
2 Halpin, supra note 1, at 184. 
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the moment of judgment. "43 The Wittgensteinian insight shows that 
"both the law and the language of the law are developed together 
at the point of determining what the law requires. "44 I believe that 
Halpin has mistook my insistence that the linguistic practice of 
talking about the law needs to be resolutely distinguished from the 
rule of recognition within a jurisdiction for a denial of the Wittgen-
steinian insight. It was not, but my argument was compressed, and 
I hope that the current reformulation makes this clear. In my ex-
ample above, the natural law theorist who refused to call judges' 
decisions "law" (because they violated independent moral re-
quirements) came to this judgment within the context of the lin-
guistic practice of talking about the law. The law and the practice 
of talking about the law were simultaneously developed when she 
made her judgment that the judges' decisions were not law. The 
Wittgensteinian insight was therefore satisfied. 
What was not simultaneously developed was the law and the rule 
of recognition in the judges' jurisdiction. For the judges' decisions 
satisfied the forms of argument within the rule of recognition and 
yet they were not law. But Patterson was wrong to conclude that 
the Wittgensteinian insight gives us a reason to believe that the law 
develops as the rule of recognition does, for that would mean mis-
deriving a theory of the law (namely some form of jurisprudential 
conventionalism) from the Wittgensteinian insight. And even Hal-
pin agrees that this is a mistake. 
43 Id. at 183. 
44 I d. at 180. 
